Military System of Ancient Persia

The ancient Persian empires held vast armies to ensure their survival. The army consisted of soldiers, cataphracts and the famous immortals in fear of mass scale of attacks and to strike fear into their foes. The Persian army in the Achaemenid period was massive and it was this army which allowed them to rule over a large portion of the Greater Iran region. The army itself was reported to be up to 150,000 warriors strong, but despite such nuthmbers, they were defeated by the Greeks, and Alexander even though they were much smaller in number. Either the morale of the soldiers was not up to the mark or the battle tactics were faulty due to which the army suffered huge losses throughout the course of history.

Persian Army

The Achaemenid Empire (559 B.C.–330 B.C.) was the first of the Persian Empires to rule over significant portions of Greater Iran. The empire possessed a ‘national army’ of roughly 120,000-150,000 troops, plus several tens of thousands of troops from their allies. The Persian army was divided into regiments of a thousand each, called hazarabam. Ten hazarabams formed a haivarabam, or division. The best known haivarabam were the Immortals, the king's personal guard division. The smallest unit was the ten-man dathaba. Ten dathabas formed the hundred men sataba. ¹

The horses of Persia were famous as well. Cavalry was the main arm of the Sassanian military organization. Another feature of that army was calling soldiers to attention by blowing trumpets. ²

Like the other empires, the army was held in great importance in the Parthian Empire as well. The Parthian society was dominated by seven families that had enriched themselves through military expeditions, land possessions and commercial privileges. These nobles/magnates were so powerful that they were able to challenge the king of kings with their own personal armies. In times of war, the great king appealed to his subordinate kings, regional and tribal lords and garrison commanders to muster their followers and bring them to the assembly point at an appointed time. In addition, the Parthians also sometimes supplemented their numbers with mercenaries.

However, in practice, the great king could often rely only on his own clan, vassals and allies. However, the cataphract cavalry formed the core of the Parthian army. On the basis of Lucian’s reference to 1,000 strong cavalry units and numerical information in the other sources, it has been conjectured that the Parthian army followed traditional nomadic practices being divided into units of 10, 100, 1,000, 10,000 men each led by its own commander according to his place in the feudal society. The small company was called wast (100 men), a regiment drafs (1,000 men), and a division gund (10,000).

The whole army (spad) was under the supreme commander (the great king, his son, or a spadpat chosen from one of the seven great families). The largest army mentioned by the sources is the Royal Army of 50,000 cataphracted horsemen that the Parthians used in the campaign against Mark Antony.

The most sizable army recorded by the sources is the one collected by the king of kings Phraates against Mark Antony, but in light of the army sizes recorded for the Sasanians it is likely that even larger forces could be collected by the king of kings when the circumstances required and allowed this.

However, it is still likely that the size of Phraates’ cavalry army should be seen to represent a typical royal cavalry army employed by the king of kings when took to the field in person. According to Justin, it contained 50,000 horsemen. However, according to Plutarch, the army in question had only 40,000 horsemen. Consequently, it is possible that Justin has included in the figure 50,000 also the servants and footmen accompanying the spare horses and the camels of the baggage train.

The martial equipment of the Parthian cataphracts consisted of the long composite bows, swords, maces, axes, daggers and pikes. According to Dio, the Parthian cavalry did not use shields, which means that they used the 3.6-4 m long contus-pike that was held with two hands. The protective equipment consisted usually of a conical helmet (usually the so-called spangenhelm, but other types were also used) which could have a face mask, and of armor (could be mail, scale, plate and segmented) with separate arm and leg defenses. The arm and leg armor could be made of mail, scale or segmented plate. The horses were also fully armored typically with hide or scale armor (steel or bronze). The light cavalry was equipped with bows and swords but did not usually wear any armor or helmets. The subject peoples, allies and mercenaries were naturally equipped with their native equipment which varied according to the type of force. ³

The size of the imperial army was never as large as the Greeks asserted. Careful examination of topography, logistics, organization of the spada, and official battle orders enable historians to arrive at reasonable figures for Persian forces. Thus, Xerxes’ 3,000,000 fighting men or 2,641,610 soldiers and an equal number of attendants were reduced to 70,000 infantry and 9,000 horsemen; the 900,000-strong army of Artaxerxes-II at Cunaxa was in reality no more than 40,000, and the 1,040,000 soldiers of Darius-III at Gaugamela is brought down to 34,000 cavalry and some infantry. Unfortunately, historians have seldom paid attention to these exaggerations, accordingly, their judgments of Persian tactics, strategy, and motives have been impaired by faulty calculations.

The organization of the spada was based on a decimal system ‘far superior to anything on the Greek side’ and was not employed in any Asiatic army until the Mongols. Ten men composed a company under a daθapati (ten companies made up a battalion under a θatapati; ten battalions formed a division under a hazarapati; and ten divisions comprised a corps under a baivarapati. The whole spada was led by a supreme commander (probably spadapati, although a generalissimo with full civil authority was called karana; who was either the Great King himself or a trusted close relative or friend (e.g., Mazares the Mede led Cyrus’ army and Datis the Mede that of Darius at Marathon). A characteristic of the Achaemenid period was that commanders and dignitaries participated in actual fighting, and many of them lost their lives in action (five of the eleven sons of Darius the Great fell on the front). ⁴

Ten Thousand Immortals

In Persian history, core troops in the Achaemenian army, so named because their number of 10,000 was immediately reestablished after every loss. Under the direct leadership of the hazarapat, or commander in chief, the Immortals, who formed the king’s personal bodyguard, consisted primarily of Persians but also included Medes and Elamites. They apparently had special privileges, such as being allowed to take concubines and servants along with them on the march. On colored glazed bricks and carved reliefs found at the Achaemenian capitals, such as the palace of Darius-I at Susa, warriors believed to be Immortals were often represented standing stiffly at attention, each soldier’s wooden spear with its silver blade and pomegranate insignia held upright and resting firmly on his toe. They wore elaborate robes and much gold jewelry. An elite 1,000 of the Immortals were further distinguished by having gold pomegranates on their spears. ⁵

Cavalry

Persian pictorial sources and Greek texts show that the bow and javelin were the chief weapons of Persian horsemen, while cuneiform sources provide more details of equipment. A text of 423/2 B.C. from the Murashu archive lists the armor and weapons of a cavalryman, including a horse with girth and reins, a saddle cloth, an iron corselet, helmet, what may be a neck-protector, a bronze-faced shield, 130 arrows and two azmaru throwing/thrusting spears. Such spears were called palta by Xenophon, who recommended them over the long Greek lance, together with Persian forms of cavalry armor.

Achaemenid cavalrymen on cylinder seals and in some Anatolian monuments appear to wear items of armor adopted from the Saka, in the form of protective shields fitted to the back or arm, high collars and domed helmets known from Central Asian burials. Other armors - combined rider-and-horse leg and thigh defenses - were also known from Greek and Anatolian sources, Greek historians of the Persian Wars tended to downplay the role of cavalry in battle, and therefore it is somewhat overlooked that the decisive battle of Plataea only came about following the Greek army's near collapse from the highly successful skirmishing attacks of the Persian horsemen. The Persians seem to have perceived the ragged Greek retreat to a stronger position to be a rout and advanced too hurriedly in pursuit. ⁶

The Persian Navy

In ancient times, large Persian fleets sailed as far west as Greece and as far east as China to conquer land or to trade. In the Mediterranean Sea, Achaemenid Persians used spy ships, disguised as foreign merchantmen, and small warships for clandestine operations. And it was the ancient Persians, during the reign of Xerxes, who invented the concept of naval infantry. ⁷ The Sassanian navy also played an important role in the military efforts of the Persians in late antiquity. The Sasanian navy was established to ensure the external security of the Persian state by exerting control over the sea lanes in the Persian Gulf region, and based on the aspiration of the Sassanid authorities to enhance their military and political, as well as commercial, influence in the northern part of the Indian Ocean. The most dynamic phase of the Persian navy’s activities occurred during the reign of Khosrow Anushirwan (531–579 A.D.), when fleet operations enabled the Persians to conquer Yemen and there was an attempt to establish the navy in the Black Sea basin. ⁸

Famous Military Leaders

Following are the brief sketches of the ancient Persian Military heroes whose role are considered important in their history:

Artemisia

Artemisia was one of the skilled admirals of Xerxes ⁹ also known as Artemisia of Caria and as Artemisia-I. She was the queen of the Anatolian region of Caria (south of ancient Lydia, in modern-day Turkey). She was most famous for her role in the naval Battle of Salamis in 480 B.C. in which she fought for the Persians and distinguished herself both for her conduct in battle and for the advice she gave the Persian king Xerxes prior to the onset of the engagement. Her name was derived from the Greek goddess Artemis, who presided over the wild and was the patron deity of hunters. Every ancient account of Artemisia depicts her as a brave and clever woman who was a valued asset to Xerxes on his expedition to conquer Greece except that of Thessalus who describes her as an unscrupulous pirate and a schemer. ¹⁰

Megabates

Megabates was an Achaemenid and a cousin of Darius-I. ¹¹ In 500 B.C., he was nominated as the military commander along with Aritagoras for the Naxos campaign. ¹² This campaign was unsuccessful because of a disagreement between the two leaders of the expedition. The disagreement had arisen over a disciplinary matter. While the ships were beached on the island of Chios, Megabates made his rounds and discovered that there was no guard posted on one of them. By way of punishment, he ordered the captain of the ship Scylax to be tied up and have his head shoved through an oar hole of the boat. Since the ships were not under sail, there wouldn’t have been any waves crashing against the hull, so Scylax was in no real danger but still, the punishment was not pleasant. Aristagoras was incensed when he heard about it because Scylax was his guest friend. He demanded Megabates to release the man, and when Megabates refused, he freed Scylax himself which infuriated Megabates as this act was a public subversion of his authority. Still, Megabates was not able to do anything about it since he was just an army general whereas Aristagoras was in charge of the entire campaign. Later on, Megabates got back to Aristagoras by sabotaging the operation against Naxos. Megabates sent some men in a boat to warn the Naxians of an attack. The Naxians who were unaware previously, immediately jumped in to action by bringing supplies in to their fortifications and shoring up their walls in preparation for a siege. When the Persians arrived, they found the city barricaded against them. They laid siege for four months without accomplishing anything and then had to concede defeat and go back home. ¹³

Megabazus

Megabazus was a commander under Darius-I, father of Oebares and of Bubares. After his Scythian campaign in 513 B.C., the king left him in Europe to conquer Thrace. ¹⁴ Darius adored Megabazus so much that he wished to have an infinite numbers of Megabazus. He was left behind with an army of eighty thousand. ¹⁵ Megabazus and his army moved right through Thrace, subduing for the king every city and every group of people that lived there. This was the mission given to him and he accomplished it. ¹⁶

Dadarsi

Dadarsi of Bacteria ¹⁷ was described as an Armenian because he held land in Armenia. ¹⁸ Another view given by the scholars was that the first was a satrap of Bactria under Darius-I (522-¬486 B.C.). When Margians became rebellious Darius ordered this Dadarsi, his servant, to quell the revolt. The Margians were defeated on 28 December 521 B.C. The second was an Armenian general under Darius-I. Together with the Persian Vaumisa, he crushed a revolt of Armenians after a series of encounters, the first of them fought at Zuzahya in Armenia on 20 May 521 B.C.; ten days later there was a second battle at the stronghold of Tigra, and finally, on 20 June 521 B.C., Dadarsi and his troops decisively defeated the rebels at the fortress of Uyama.¹⁹

The common thing among all four famous military leaders was that they all were austere in general. They were somehow loyal to their leaders but were brutal and harsh for their enemies without caring the poor and weak. They used to fight for their nation but never tried to convince their opponents towards the right way of mutual understanding to avoid war and used to crush the opponents only because of their false worldly gods. Megabates was that much selfish that he became the reason of his own army’s defeat because of his personal grudge to Aristagoras and no other soldier/knight except these four got much fame in ancient Persian history.

Ancient Persian Wars

There is a brief history of different famous wars of antient Persians which might lead a reader towards the correct understanding of their worldly approach:

Battle of Marathon

The Battle of Marathon was the first attempt of Persia, under the reign of King Darius-I, to subjugate Greece. The battle was fought in Marathon plain of northeastern Attica and was fought in 490 B.C. ²⁰ It was fought between the citizens of Athens, aided by Palatea, and a Persian force commanded by Datis and Artaphernes. The Athenian generals decided to confront the Persians as soon they landed, The Athenians assembled an army of about 9,000, mainly hoplite soldiers. They were joined by a further 600 or so men from the smaller city of Plataea, which lay North West of Attica and had been an ally of Athens for some 30 years. ²¹ Datis landed on the Bay of Marathon with 20,000 infantry, archers, and cavalry. The force faced the great marsh to the west of Mount Drakonera, and was located just northeast of Athens. ²² The Athenian hoplite formations were organized well out of the range of foot or horse archery. They were trained to move literally as one battle unit, with each man expected to steadfastly adhere to his position and function within the phalanx.

The phalanxes themselves were eight men deep, allowing for losses in the front lines to be rapidly replaced. The Athenians took up their position at the southern end of the plain with Mount Agrielki on their left flank and the sea to the right; the Brexisa marsh lay slightly to the rear. The coastal road to Athens was then effectively sealed. It is more likely that the Greeks waited for the enemy to make a move. The Athenians and Plataians were heavily outnumbered and their generals will have been reluctant to move from their strong defensive position into the open plain of Marathon. To do so would have left them vulnerable to cavalry attacks and the possibility of being outmaneuvered by the larger Persian force. It is also possible that the Athenians were waiting for the arrival of reinforcements from Sparta. Before they left Athens to march to Marathon the Athenians had sent their best runner, Philippides, to the Spartans with a request for aid. He covered the distance of approximately 140 miles in less than two days. The Spartans agreed to send a small army to help the Athenians, but their departure was delayed because they were in the middle of a major religious festival and had to wait until the full moon signaled its completion. ²³ The two forces faced each other, and both forces remained static as no one wanted to attack first. The Persians remained immobile because they had no wish to engage their weak and inferior infantry against the Greek hoplites in their fully prepared position. They were also hoping for signal from Hippias, their friend within Athens itself: but the stalemate could not last indefinitely and Datis finally put his own battle plans into action. Datis re-embarked most of this cavalry as well as his task force and, slipping out, sailed for Phaleron Bay leaving behind Artaphenes with a holding force facing the Athenians. ²⁴ The Athenians after knowing the departure of Datis, decided to march first.

From a distance of roughly 1,600 yards, the Athenians charged downhill, straight toward the Achaemenids. The hoplites had extended their lines by thinning out their center. This was to deny Achaemenid cavalry any chance of outflanking the Athenian front. The Achaemenids were actually caught totally by surprise, as their cavalry was being watered and fed when the attack came. ²⁵ The Achaemenids calmly waited for the Athenians to come into archery range and then opened fire. Wave after wave of missiles now rained down upon the Athenians. But this time Achaemenid archery proved ineffective. The Greeks' interlocking shields protected them from the deadly salvos of Persian archery. Each hoplite was also well protected by bronze helmets, greaves, and tough body armor which negated the worst effects of Medo-Persian archery. The Greeks closed the distance between the two armies as quickly as they could and they clashed across a broad front.

In the center, where the best Persian troops were concentrated, they pushed the Athenians back, pursuing them towards their original camp. On the wings, however, the Athenians and the Plataians, who were concentrated on the left wing, succeeded in driving the Persian forces back and disrupting the cohesion and discipline of Datis' army. The Achaemenid cavalry had returned to the main force, immediately pushing forward to rescue their hard-pressed comrades. Despite heavy losses, the Persian and Saka cavalry did manage to push back the Athenian center. That success, however, was a temporary battlefield mirage, as the hoplites had maneuvered their adversaries into a deadly trap. They now forced themselves against the Achaemenid left and right flanks. The Achaemenid cavalry did their best to prevent the flanks from collapsing, but to no avail. As the flanks collapsed, the Achaemenids found themselves surrounded, with the Greeks losing no time in destroying them. The survivors of the doomed force retreated south toward the shore where they were evacuated by a rescue fleet. The Greeks pursued and killed huge numbers of the fleeing forces before they reached their ships. Other retreating troops drowned in the nearby swamp. In the final count of the casualties the Persians had lost 6,400 men and an unrecorded number of prisoners and their 7 ships were lost. The Athenians lost their 192 men along with their commander in chief Callirnachus. ²⁶

Battle of Salamis

The battle of Salamis was the naval battle fought between the Persian and Greeks. The king of Persia at that time was Xerxes, and that of Greek was Themistocles. The battle was fought in 480 B.C. ²⁷ The battle was fought in the straits between the mainland and Salamis, an island in the Saronic Gulf near Athens, and marked the high-point of the second Persian invasion of Greece. The Persian fleet consisted of around 800 galleys. ²⁸ According to Herodotus, the Greeks initially mustered 271 triremes and 9 penteconters at Artemisium. Athens supplied 147 triremes, though not all of their crews. The Plataeans, their only allies at Marathon ten years earlier, courageously and enthusiastically, with no experience of seafaring, helped the Athenians fill their ships. On the second day of the battle 53 more Athenian triremes arrived, possibly having been held back to guard the southern entrance to the Euripus Channel but moving up on confirmation that the entire Persian fleet was gathered opposite Artemisium. Most of the Athenian triremes had been built in the previous three years so battle experience, mostly gained at war with Aegina, was thinly spread. Herodotus’ grand total of the Athenian ships was up to 380. ²⁹ King Xerxes had an observation point prepared so that he could watch the battle. It was positioned opposite the town of Salamis with a good view of Psyttaleia, the island where a detachment of Persian troops had landed during the night. This position was favorable to the Greeks, because of tactical disadvantage face by the Persians would face there. Persian fleet had faced considerable difficulties in maneuvers in the narrow straits of Salamis.

The two armies were in front of each other. Both sides had to some extent determined in advance how the battle would be fought. It was up to the captains of the individual ships to make decisions on the spot. The main decision that many of Xerxes' captains made was to turn away from the attacking Greeks, causing more confusion as they encountered their own ships trying to go forward and impress the king with their prowess. In the resulting chaos, the captains of the Greek ships urged on their much fresher crews and pressed the attack with great success. By the morning of battle, the Persians had deployed their fleet, with their right wing held by the skillful Phoenicians and the Ionian ships were on the left. While maneuvering to form positions, Persians were rowed upon the by the Greeks who began to force the leading Persian ships back to their fellow, causing disorder to the overcrowded Persians formation. This was followed the Athenian flank attacked on the Phoenician ships, which were pushed backed into their own center toward the coast of Attica. Triremes were generally armed with a large ram at the front, with which it was possible to sink an enemy ship, or at least disable it by shearing off the banks of oars on one side. If the initial ramming was not successful, marines boarded the enemy ship and something similar to a land battle ensued. Both sides had marines on their ships for this eventuality; the Greeks with fully armed hoplites; the Persians probably with more lightly armed infantry.

Across the battlefield, as the first line of Persian ships was pushed back by the Greeks, they became fouled in the advancing second and third lines of their own ships. On the Greek left, the Persian admiral Ariabignes (a brother of Xerxes) was killed early in the battle; left disorganized and leaderless, the Phoenician squadrons appear to have been pushed back against the coast, many vessels running aground. Secondly, right before Xerxes' eyes, his elite troops, who included three of his own nephews, were slaughtered by the Athenians. ³⁰ The battle entered its main phase with an increasing number of ‘dogfights’ flaring up along the line but no major breakthrough. The Greeks probably had kept few ships back in reserve but the Persians sent in large numbers as soon as possible after sunrise, pressing in behind the assault squadrons. Few of the Ionians responded to Themistocles’ appeal to hang back in battle and Herodotus refers to a long list he compiled of Ionian captains that took Greek ships. Herodotus comments, ‘the Greeks fought with discipline and held their formation, but the barbarians allowed theirs to be broken up and did not seem to be following any plan, so things were bound to turn out for them as they did’. The Persian fleet had a confusion in it. Phoenicians proceeded to the king and tried to excuse their failure by complaining that they had been betrayed by the Ionians, whom they blamed for the confusion in the Persian fleet. Unfortunately for them, while they were in the presence of the king, one of the Ionian ships, from Samothrake, was seen to ram an Athenian trireme and then get rammed by an Aiginetan one. The marines on the Ionian ship immediately boarded and captured the Aiginetan vessel, proving to Xerxes both their loyalty and their valor. The king was now so angry at what he was seeing that he ordered to behead the Phoenician complainant. Towards the end of the day. The Persian fleet retreated in confusion to the Bay of Phaleron and failed in its objective of forcing the Greeks away from Salamis. The Greeks unexpectedly won the Battle and had sent the enemy back to their anchorage in disarray.

According to Diodoros, the Greeks lost 40 ships and Persian lost more than 200 ships, excluding those which were captured along with their crew. ³¹ The rest of the Persian fleet was scattered, and as a result Xerxes had to postpone his planned land offensives for a year because he went back to Persia.

Battle of Thermopylae

The battle of Thermopylae was fought between the Greek and Persian army. The Greek army consisted of alliance of Greek city states, which was led by the king of Sparta named Leonidas and the Persian army by the king Xerxes. The battle was fought in 480 B.C. at the pass of Thermopylae. Vastly outnumbered, the Greeks delayed the enemy in one of the most famous last stands of history. The small force led by King Leonidas of Sparta blocked the only road through which the massive army of Xerxes could pass. The Persians succeeded in defeating the Greeks but sustained heavy losses, incredibly disproportionate to those of the Greeks. The strength of Greek force was around 8,000. The troops which were sent to the pass were Peloponnesians: 300 Spartans; 1000 Tegeans and Mantineans; 126 Orchomenians from Arcadia; 1,000 from rest of Arcadia; 400 Corinthians; 200 from Phlius; and 30 Mykenaeans. The strength of northern Greeks was: 700 Thespians; 400 Thebans; 1000 Phocians and the whole force of Opuntian Locrains. The grand total which came to the pass as a defender was 7,300. ³² The figures given by Herodotus are impossibly high. He claimed that the total manpower was 5,283,220 gathered from all over the empire, the infantry numbering 1,700,000, as well as 300,000 from those Thracians and Greeks who had 'medized', with the cavalry, apart from the camels and chariots, numbering 80,000. Modern scholarship has rejected these numbers because it seems erroneous calculation of Herodotus which makes his work questionable at least in the case of Greek and Persian wars and has settled on 80,000 as a sober estimate of Xerxes' land forces. ³³

When the Persian army reached the entrance to Thermopylae, the Greeks instigated a council meeting. The Peloponnesians advised withdrawing to the isthmus and defending only the Peloponnesus there. The Phocians and Locrians, whose states were located nearby, becoming indignant, advised defending Thermopylae and sending for more help. Leonidas thought it best to adopt their plan. Before the Battle, Xerxes asked Leonidas forcefully to surrender their arms, but Leonidas refused. ³⁴ The old Phocian wall was in a ruinous condition, so the Greeks immediately set about repairing it. But the strength of the Thermopylae position was lessened by the existence of a number of flanking routes either southwards or eastwards round the gates. After the Persian host had arrived at Thermopylae, there was a delay of four days before the actual assault began. The Spartans, calmly awaiting the Persian onslaught, passed their time in taking exercise and combing their hair in front of the Phocian wall. On the first day Xerxes sent his Median and Kissian troops, and after their failure to clear the pass, the elite Immortals entered the battle but in the brutal close-quarter fighting, the Greeks held firm. The Greek tactic of feigning a disorganized retreat and then turning on the enemy in the phalanx formation also worked well, lessening the threat from Persian arrows and perhaps the hoplites surprised the Persians with their disciplined mobility, a benefit of being a professionally trained army. The second day followed the pattern of the first, and the Greek forces still held the pass. ³⁵ After the end of two days of fighting, Persians were still not able to get through the pass and defeat the Greeks. The turning of battle was when a Malian man Ephalites revealed to Xerxes the existence of unfrequented mountain path. The Greeks called him the Betrayer of the fatal secret. ³⁶ The path led from east of the Persian camp along the ridge of Mt. Anopaea behind the cliffs that flanked the pass. It branched, one path leading to Phocis, and the other down to the Gulf of Malis at Alpenus, first town of Locris. Leonidas had stationed 1000 Phocian volunteers on the heights to guard this path. Leonidas first received the news that the Persians were crossing the mountains from deserters, who came in during the night, and then from lookouts posted on the heights who ran down to inform him just after dawn. So began the famous last day at Thermopylae. Upon receipt of the news that their position was about to be turned, Leonidas held a council of war, which revealed a split in the allies' opinions between retreat and resistance. Leonidas ordered the allies to retreat, with the exception of 700 Thespians and 400 Thebans, because, in Herodotus' own opinion, he perceived there was a lack of will to fight, and did not want such a potentially damaging and divisive split to be made public. His decision to stay with his 300 Spartans, Herodotus continues, was motivated by a Delphic oracle, which prophesied that either Sparta 'must be laid waste by the foreigner or a Spartan king be killed'.³⁷

Leonidas led the remaining hoplites forward to engage the enemy. Xerxes' main army was urged on by the officers, some of whom used whips to drive their more reluctant soldiers into battle. The result was a fierce and bloody combat in which many Persians fell, some trampled by their own comrades. The hoplites initially fought with their spears, but when these were broken, they used their short swords. Among the casualties were two of Xerxes' half-brothers, presumably fighting in the front ranks of the Persians. Finally, Leonidas himself fell and his body then became a prize fought over by the Spartans and the Persians.

When Hydarnes and the Immortals emerged from the Anopaia pathway and approached the rear of the Greeks, the Spartans, their surviving helots and Thespians moved to a small hill behind the Phokian wall and made a last stand there, fighting with swords, bare hands and even teeth, until the Persians drew back and slew the last of them with arrows. Some of the Thebans managed to separate themselves and surrendered, but the Persian king was ill-tempered in victory. He enslaved the Thebans and branded them with his royal symbol; their city had submitted to him, but they had joined his enemies. He also had the body of Leonidas impaled and decapitated, so enraged was he with the Spartan king's defiance. According to Herodotus, Leonidas and his army had cost Xerxes 20,000 men. ³⁸

Battle of Plataea

Battle of Plataea was the final battle in the series of battle fought between the Persian and Greek city states under the conquest of Persian king Xerxes who raided Greece. After the defeat at Salamis, Xerxes was fed up with his army and flew back to Persia, because winter was coming and he had been out of the capital for a long time. Before he withdrew, he left his cousin Mardonios as head of the army in order to continue the military operations. Mardonios was a stubborn and brave man (his name means the ‘gallant’ in ancient Iranian, originating from the word ‘mard’ for the man or the warrior). When Mardonios was informed that the Spartans were campaigning against him, he evacuated Attica. Before leaving Athens, he destroyed what was left after the first Persian conquest of the city.

The reason for the withdrawal of the Persian army from Attica was that the country’s ground was not suitable for the tactics and the charge of the Persian cavalry on which Mardonios was based to achieve victory over the Spartans and the other allies. ³⁹ In the spring of 479 B.C., the Persian fleet re-grouped at Samos, whilst in June Mardonius left his winter quarters in Thessaly and once again invaded Attica before withdrawing to hold a line in Boeotia, north of the river Asopus, where he built a large fortified camp. The Greek fleet, meanwhile, re-grouped at Aegina and then sailed to hold station at Delos whilst the land army mobilized. In July, the Spartan army moved towards Plataea and met up with the other Greek contingents at Eleusis before all moved into position, forming a 7 km long front just 3-4 km opposite the Persians, below the low hills of Cithaeron. ⁴⁰ The total number of Greek’s army deployed was total of 110,000. Out of those troops, there were both heavy armed and light armed. The Spartans were accompanied by Helots who were light armed. Every Spartan was accompanied by the contingent of seven Helots. ⁴¹ Herodotus mentions the sizes of the Persian army, which have been the subject of many modern debates and controversies. According to him, Mardonios had 300,000 warriors. The figure of Mardonios’ troops is definitely exaggerated. Mardonios had at his disposal around 150,000 men, combatants and non-combatant auxiliaries. ⁴² His army contained a lot more cavalry than the Greeks' and he used it to harass the supply lines of Pausanias and his men. On one occasion his cavalry captured a whole Greek supply column. They also succeeded in rendering unusable the main source of drinking water for the Greeks, a spring called Gargaphia. These cavalry raids continued for nearly two weeks, gradually reducing the Greek supply lines until Pausanias was left with no choice but to move his army closer to the city of Plataea, where there was water and a good supply of food. Mardonius finally took the initiative and sent in his cavalry. His purpose was to soften the Greeks up and ideally break them, or to provoke them into coming down from the higher ground. The cavalry did find a weak point in the part of the line held by the Megarians but an elite squad of Athenian hoplites and the Athenian archer regiment was called up and killed their commander Masistius and the attack was beaten off after a fierce mêlée (a confused fight or scuffle). ⁴³

Pausanias, in order to protect his flanks and rear and in an effort to reach a water supply, now, under the cover of darkness, moved the Greek center back to the base of the Cithaeron hill, just in front of Plataea. This caused some confusion in the Greek army. Just as the Persians looked like they were getting the upper-hand, the Greek right flank of Spartans and Tegeans counter-attacked. When the Greek left flank joined them, the Persian forces, boxed in by their own center coming in behind them, lacking a disciplined formation and finally, inadequately defending themselves behind a barricade of weaker shields, were routed. Even more significantly, Mardonius was hit by a rock thrown by the Spartan Arimnestus and killed. The superior weapons and armor of the hoplites in the end proved decisive. The leaderless Persians then broke and fled. As always in an ancient battle, the casualties of a routing army were horrific. Thousands of Persians were slaughtered on the retreat or in their camp; what was left of the Persian army withdrew north into Thessaly. Fighting between Greeks and Persians continued for many years, but the Persians never invaded Greece again. In that battle, the Persians lost 30,000 men and the Greeks, 2000. ⁴⁴

Battle of Gaugamela

The battle of Gaugamela was the final battle fought between the Macedonian king Alexander and the Persian king Darius-III, which resulted in a decisive victory of Alexander over the Persian king. The battle was fought on 1st October 331 B.C. at a place 60 miles from Arbela. ⁴⁵ After losing battle at Issus, which resulted in captured of his mother, wife and two daughters, Darius-III retreated to Babylon where he regrouped his remaining army. Darius had sent envoys to Alexander offering him an alliance in return for the captured members of the Great King's family but Alexander refused. Later, during the siege of Tyre, Darius made a more concrete proposal: 10,000 talents ransom for the members of the royal family, the cession of all Persian territory west of the Euphrates, marriage with Darius' daughter, and alliance. In any event, in the spring of 331 B.C. Alexander left Egypt for the long march into Persia. He finally swung over towards the Euphrates, which he reached in early August. There he learned that Darius was waiting for him far to the south with a large army outside Babylon. But Alexander was not drawn down the Euphrates, where the problems of supply were great, simply to fight Darius on level terrain ideal for the Persian army. Instead, after bridging and crossing the river, Alexander actually turned north for a while before swinging east, keeping the foothills of the Armenian mountains on his left in country which offered pasturage for the horses and supplies for the army. Darius finally abandoned his position at Babylon and moved north across the Tigris, which he hoped to use as his line of defense against Alexander. ⁴⁶

Darius, however, had learned his lesson at the Issus and had carefully chosen Gaugamela for his next, and hopefully last, battle against Alexander. Darius arranged his army in different way from previous. The Persian army was enormous. Although Arrian's figure of more than 1,000,000 may be rejected out of hand, it is possible that Darius had somewhere between 100,000 to 150,000 men on the field. The Persian battle order is known with some precision, for Darius' written instructions were afterwards taken in to possession after the Persians lost the battle. The left wing, facing Alexander himself on the Macedonian right, was held by Bactrian cavalry with Asiatic Scythians and Arachotians. The Persians themselves were stationed in the center. Here, in accordance with usual practice, the king with his royal entourage took up his position. The right wing was held by troops from Syria, Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. An advance force screened the left wing. This force was composed of Scythian cavalry, 1,000 Bactrian’s and 100 scythed chariots. The elephants, with 50 chariots, were posted in front of Darius himself. Greek mercenaries, with Persian troops stationed on either side, were also drawn up in front of him in the central sector. Alexander's army numbered about 40,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalries. ⁴⁷ After assembling a small scouting party, Alexander looked down from a hill, unobserved by Darius, assessing the king’s preparation. The night before battle, Alexander held a council of his generals; Parmenio, the commander of Alexander’s left flank, suggested that the large size of Darius’s forces called for them to attack at night; however, Alexander disagreed. Alexander and his companion cavalry took position on the right flank while Parmenio, as usual, held the left flank. Stationed in the middle were the well-trained Macedonian phalanx with lighter infantry and archers on either side. ⁴⁸

The two armies advanced towards each other slowly in line of battle and both sides made cautious and calculated preliminary maneuvers. The wide plain completely favored Darius, giving him every opportunity to exploit his superior numbers. The Persian host far outflanked Alexander's army on either side, but Alexander, determined as always to retain the flanking advantage, led his cavalry off continually towards the right. Alexander method was to drive hard at Persian left, while infantry held the center, but at war of Gaugamela, his infantry did not attack the center head-on, as the Macedonians had tackled the Greeks and Kaedakas in first engagement. Instead it advanced obliquely, the hypaspists following closely the cavalry attack, and the remaining pezhetairoi surging to keep up with the hypaspists. And like in the battle of Issus, a gap occurred as a phalanx rushed forward, which was exploited by the enemy.⁴⁹ Alexander saw the gap develop and immediately wheeled to charge it in a wedge formation. As he broke through, he turned against the center of the Persian line, heading straight for Darius who was stationed in his own center. By this time Macedonian infantry had poured into the gap behind the cavalry, and Darius panicked, and fled away. ⁵⁰

Darius was later murdered by one of his satraps, and Alexander took the Persian capital Babylon. The Macedonian victory spelled the end of the Persian Empire founded by Cyrus-II and left Alexander the master of southwest Asia. The Macedonian lost 700 men and that of Persian lost 20,000 men in this battle. ⁵¹

The army of the ancient Persians, as described by the historians, seemed to be very dashing and bold, but their warfare histories have proved that this large and so-called army was nothing more than a group of men with a low morale. The army was used for personal benefit of the king, or for the defense of the state or for territorial expansion for economic purposes. If the same army had fought for the establishment of the divine message, peace and justice, it would have become the best fighting force of the world like the Muslims, who had always been smaller in number, but since they fought for justice, peace and order, they were provided with divine help.

• ¹ Nick Sekunda & Simon Chew (1992), The Persian Army 560-330 B.C., Osprey Publications, London, U.K., Pg. 5.
• ² S. V. Sohoni (1957), Annals of Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute: Samudragupta’s Expedition Against Persia (356-362 A.D.), Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Maharashtra, India, Vol. 38, No. 3-4, Pg. 219.
• ³ Ilkka Syvanne (2017), Historia I Swiat: Parthian Cataphract vs the Roman Army 53 B.C.- 224 A.D., Instytut Histori Stosunkow Międzynarodowych Warszawa, Poland, Issue: 6, Pg. 34-36.
• ⁴ Encyclopedia Iranica (Online Version): " target="_blank"> http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/army-i Retrieved: 17-02-2019
• ⁵ Encyclopedia Britannica (Online Version): https://www.britannica.com/topic/Ten-Thousand-Immortals: Retrieved: 12-02-2019
• ⁶ John Curtis & Nigel Tallis (2005), Forgotten Empire: The World of Ancient Persia, The British Museum Press, London, U.K., Pg. 216.
• ⁷ Fariborz Haghshenass (2008), Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, USA, Pg. 4.
• ⁸ Vladmir A. Dimitriv (2017), The International Journal of Maritime History: The Sassanian Navy Revisited, An Unwritten Chapter in Iran’s Military History, Sage Publishing, New York, USA, Vol. 29, Pg. 727.
• ⁹ Joyce E. Salisbury (2001), Encyclopedia of Women in the Ancient World, ABC-Clio, California, USA, Pg. 20.
• ¹⁰ Ancient History Encyclopedia (Online Version): https://www.ancient.eu/Artemisia_I_of_Caria/: Retrieved: 17-02-2019
• ¹¹ Herodotus (2008), The Histories (Translated by Robin Waterfield), Oxford University Press, Oxford, U.K., Pg. 315.
• ¹² Dennis L. Fink (2014), The Battle of Marathon in Scholarship: Research, Theories and Controversies since 1850, Mcfarland & Company Inc., New Carolina, USA, Pg. 82.
• ¹³ Debra Hamel (2012), Reading Herodotus, The John Hopkins University Press, Maryland, USA, Pg. 164-165.
• ¹⁴ Brill Online Reference Works: https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-pauly/megabazus-e728940: Retrieved: 18-02-2019
• ¹⁵ George Rawlinson (1859), The History of Herodotus, John Murray, London, U.K., Pg. 118.
• ¹⁶ Amelie Kuhrt (2007), The Persian Empire: A Corpus of Sources from the Achaemenid Period, Routledge, New York, USA, Pg. 205.
• ¹⁷ Pierre Briant (2002), From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire (Translated by Peter T. Daniels), Eisenbrauns, Indiana, USA, Pg. 352.
• ¹⁸ Anne Fitzpatrick-Mckinly (2015), Empire, Power and Indigenous Elites, Brill, Leiden, Netherlands, Pg. 188.
• ¹⁹ Encyclopedia Iranica (Online Version): http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/dadarsis-old-persian-name-derived-from-darsto-dare-kent-old-persian-p: Retrieved: 18-02-2019
• ²⁰ Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Marathon Retrieved: 05-02-2019.
• ²¹ Philip de Souza (2003), Greek and Persian Wars 499-386 B.C., Osprey Publications, London, U.K., Pg. 32.
• ²² Dr. Kaveh Farrokh (2002), Shadows in the Desert, Osprey Publications, London, U.K., Pg. 74.
• ²³ Philip de Souza (2003), Greek and Persian Wars 499-386 B.C., Osprey Publications, London, U.K., Pg. 32.
• ²⁴ Jack Cassin-Scott (1977), The Greek and Persian Wars 500-323 B.C., Osprey Publications, London, U.K., Pg. 7.
• ²⁵ Dr. Kaveh Farrokh (2002), Shadows in the Desert, Osprey Publications, London, U.K., Pg. 72.
• ²⁶ Jack Cassin-Scott (1977), The Greek and Persian Wars 500-323 B.C., Osprey Publications, London, U.K., Pg. 9.
• ²⁷ Ibid, Pg. 15.
• ²⁸ Encyclopedia Britannica: https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Salamis: Retrieved: 07-02-2019.
• ²⁹ William Shepherd (2010), Salamis 480 B.C., Osprey Publications, London, U.K., Pg. 38.
• ³⁰ Philip de Souza (2003), Greek and Persian Wars 499-386 B.C., Osprey Publications, London, U.K., Pg. 65.
• ³¹ H. T. Wallinga (2005), Xerxes Greek Adventure, Brill Leiden Publication, Leiden, Netherlands, Pg. 129.
• ³² G. B. Grundy (1901), The Great Persians War and Its Preliminaries, William Clowes and Sons, London, U.K., Pg. 273.
• ³³ Nic Fields (2007), Thermopylae 480 B.C., Osprey Publications, London, U.K., Pg. 55.
• ³⁴ New World Encyclopedia: http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Battle_of_Thermopylae: Retrieved: 08-02-2019.
• ³⁵ Ancient History Encyclopedia: https://www.ancient.eu/thermopylae/: Retrieved: 08-02-2019.
• ³⁶ George Grote (1849), History of Greece, Richard and John E. Taylor, London, U.K., Vol. 5, Pg. 18.
• ³⁷ Nic Fields (2007), Thermopylae 480 B.C., Osprey Publications, London, U.K., Pg. 80.
• ³⁸ Philip de Souza (2003), Greek and Persian Wars 499-386 B.C., Osprey Publications, London, U.K., Pg. 57.
• ³⁹ Periklis Deligiannis, The Battle of Plataea, 479 B.C.: Strategy, Tactics, Opposing Armies, Strategic and Battlefield Maneuvers, Analysis of the Conflict, Published by Author, Athens, Greece, Pg. 2-3.
• ⁴⁰ Ancient History Encyclopedia (Online): https://www.ancient.eu/Plataea/: Retrieved: 09-02-2019.
• ⁴¹ William S. Snyder (1915), Military Analysis of Greece, The Gorham Press, Boston, USA, Pg. 403.
• ⁴² Periklis Deligiannis, The Battle of Plataea, 479 B.C.: Strategy, Tactics, Opposing Armies, Strategic and Battlefield Maneuvers, Analysis of the Conflict, Published by Author, Athens, Greece, Pg.8-9.
• ⁴³ William Shepherd (2012), Plataea 479 B.C, Osprey Publications, London, U.K., Pg. 55.
• ⁴⁴ Encyclopedia Britannica: https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Plataea: Retrieved: 10-02-2019.
• ⁴⁵ Encyclopedia Iranica: http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/gaugamela-: Retrieved: 10-02-2019.
• ⁴⁶ Arther Ferrill (1997), Origin of War, West View Press, Colorado, USA, Pg. 207.
• ⁴⁷ Ruth Sheppard (2008), Alexander the Great at Wars, Osprey Publications, London, U.K., Pg. 173.
• ⁴⁸ Ancient History Encyclopedia (Online): https://www.ancient.eu/Battle_of_Gaugamela: Retrieved: 10-02-2019.
• ⁴⁹ Waldemar Heckel (2002), The Wars of Alexander the Great: 336–323 B.C., Part 3, Osprey Publications, London, U.K., Pg. 225.
• ⁵⁰ Arther Ferrill (1997), Origin of War, West View Press, Colorado, USA, Pg. 210.
• ⁵¹ Encyclopedia Britannica (Online): https://www.britannica.com/event/Battle-of-Gaugamela: Retrieved: 10-02-2019.